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## D I S C U S S I O N   P A P E R

Task Force Training Plans Committee

### Planning Premises

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- ONE: The realities involved in any current CLW situation, such as follows, necessitate full consideration of the development of a rapid, maximum impact type operation:
- immediately upon learning of a threat to a government in power it is most likely the government will appeal to the U.N.;
  - if it is a Communist controlled government, in addition to appealing to the U.N., it is most likely an appeal will also be made to the USSR to come to its defense;
  - the modern capability effectively to counter a resistance or a guerrilla operation increases generally with the amount of time available for assembling and concentrating a government's resources;
  - the retention of plausible denial dissipates in direct ratio to the expansion of time and effort.
- TWO: The study of guerrilla operations and counter guerrilla operations basically should be considered as one subject as a knowledge of each is essential to the other. Competency, however, in these subjects requires additional and separate study and training.
- THREE: There is a mistaken belief that plausible denial necessarily implies the utilization of items indigenous to the area or capable of being improvised from locally available resources. Entirely new items may be introduced providing adequate preparations are made to establish plausible denial of U.S. participation.
- FOUR: There are relatively few items of military or clandestine hardware or devices which may be definitely classed as beyond rendering plausibly deniable.
- FIVE: There are scientific and technical advances in the field of both tradecraft and materiel which could be prepared as plausibly deniable and the utilization of same would greatly enhance the possibility of developing maximum impact in the minimum time.
- SIX: While the effort and cost involved in a maximum impact - minimum time operation would undoubtedly appear expensive initially - the value of the objective as weighed against the estimated cost should be judged on the basis of "one dollar in time saves nine".

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### Proposed Training Outline

It is proposed that the second field task force training operational plan reflect the above planning premises in the following manner:

- a. The first week of instruction would represent the build-up period - maximization of capability.
- b. The second week would be the field implementation of the first phase of the maneuver plan - maximum impact, guerrilla operation.
- c. The third week would be the second phase of the maneuver plan - a counter guerrilla situation which assumes the friendly forces had been restored to power and the erstwhile opposition had resorted to guerrilla operations.
- d. The final day of the period should be devoted entirely to a critique seminar.

### Training Objectives

#### General Objectives -

- a. Through the medium of the Task Force Training Plans Committee experiment with a new doctrinal approach to the planning and conduct of a task force operation based upon the above planning premises.
- b. Provide selected, qualified, CIA-Contingency Force personnel with a familiarization of task force operations as well as an opportunity to contribute to the development of a new doctrinal approach.
- c. Provide the operational basis for testing or experimenting with new or different techniques, procedures, devices and equipment likely to be employed in a task force situation.

#### Specific Objectives -

(To be derived by the Committee according with the planning of the three periods or weeks of instruction and operational maneuver).

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